Alternative theories of morphology in the Parallel Architecture : a reply to Benavides 2022

The Slot and Structure Model of morphology (SSM: Benavides 2022) presents itself as an extension of the Parallel Architecture (PA: Jackendoff 1997, 2002). The present article compares SSM to Relational Morphology (Jackendoff and Audring 2020) and Construction Morphology (Booij 2010), which also claim allegiance to the Parallel Architecture. It is shown that (a) SSM does not segregate semantic structure from syntactic structure, violating the fundamental premise of the PA; (b) SSM is concerned primarily with deriving productive morphology, while the PA is stated in terms of declarative schemas that license nonproductive as well as productive morphology; (c) SSM enforces a strict division between morphology and syntax, while the PA allows a degree of interpenetration. Finally, Benavides accuses RM of lacking a direct connection between semantics and syntax. It is shown that this is based on a misunderstanding of the RA formalism

X-Bar Semantics

Proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society (1987), pp. 355-36

Re-casting Metal: Rhythm and Meter in the Music of Meshuggah jonathan pieslak

The music of the Swedish metal band, Meshuggah, reveals a distinct rhythmic and metric structure based on large-scale odd time signatures, mixed meter, and metric superimposition. Their 2004 EP "I," however, pushes the boundaries of surface-level meter through the absence of smallscale recurring units of pitch and rhythm. This article uses models for rhythmic analysis developed by Harald Krebs, Fred Lerdahl and Ray Jackendoff, William Rothstein, and Maury Yeston in pursuing an architectonic examination of hierarchical layers in this music. Additionally, I introduce the important relationship that exists between fans and structural analysis based on a socio-cultural profile of the subgenre

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis